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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with aggregation offuzzy individual opinions into a single group 
opinion, based upon hierarchical intensity aggregation rules. Characterization theorems 
are given, and it is also shown that Montero's rationality and standard ethical 
conditions propagate under hierarchical ggregations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we investigate properties of hierarchical aggregation of 
intensity preferences, i.e., aggregation of intensity preferences that in turn 
represent aggregate opinions of group of individuals. 
Our results relate to the ongoing research work on axiomatic ap- 
proaches to group decision-making in a fuzzy environment (see [4, 7, 8, 11]). 
In particular, this paper is related to the model started in [9, 10] and 
subsequently characterized in [6]. Arrow's paradox in group decision-mak- 
ing (cf. [1]) has been translated in these papers into a fuzzy context, 
showing that his negative result can be avoided in several ways. Aggrega- 
tion of preferences will be obtained here through intensity aggregation 
rules that will allow the successive aggregation of alternatives. In particular 
we will show how this intensity aggregation rules can be combined in an 
hierarchical fashion and we will study what functional properties are 
preserved by the hierarchical combinations. 
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This approach reflects common events in real life. Consider for instance 
the following two extreme circumstances: 
• Each member of a deciding committee xpresses her/his opinion on 
the basis of a personal search of the whole society (usually democratic 
political parties in nonfederal states claim that they are expressing the 
best consensus laws for the whole country). 
• The society has been divided into disjoint groups, in such a way that 
each member of the deciding committee represents the aggregated 
opinion of one of these groups (as in democratic federal states where 
each state is assumed to define its own aggregated opinion about any 
issue, to be aggregated with the other states opinions). 
In between these two extreme cases, global aggregated preference can 
be obtained by allowing individuals to influence any a priori fixed partial 
aggregations ( ocial opinion is an aggregation of nondisjoint subsets, in 
such a way that some individuals have influence in more than one of these 
smaller groups). For instance, 
• agreements between owners and workers in a firm are aggregations of
two different groups that may not be disjoint. Some workers may own 
a portion of the firm and therefore their opinions have positive weight 
in both sides of any labor conflict. 
In all of the above cases, the goal is to produce a social opinion. 
This goal may be reached in many ways. In [2, 3], several measures of 
individual and group consensus are proposed, analyzed, and then used to 
generate associated measures of distance to consensus, by considering 
several common goals of group discussion. In the next section, we will 
introduce a degree of rationality (of the aggregation method) that in some 
way can be viewed as a particular goal in consensus procedures, allowing a 
measure of distance from consistency. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
We will analyze hierarchical aggregation of individual fuzzy preferences 
in the context of the model proposed in [6]. At the basis of such a model 
are non-absolutely irrational (in the sense of [9, 10]) complete fuzzy prefer- 
ence relations. That is each individual is assumed to be able to express 
her/his opinion about any possible set of alternatives through some 
complete fuzzy binary preference relation, allowing an aggregated group 
opinion in terms of another complete fuzzy preference relation. The above 
concepts are formalized as follows. 
Let /x: X x X ---> [0, 1] be a fuzzy preference relation over an arbitrary 
finite set of alternatives X. /z(x, y) represents the degree to which the 
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relation x not worse than y holds. The completeness hypothesis is ex- 
pressed by 
IX(x, y) + IX(y, x) > 1 Vx, y E X. (2.1) 
Following [5], completeness is required in order to assure that all individu- 
als consider the set of alternatives on which they are expressing their 
opinions, feasible and comprehensive. 
The values 
Ixl(x, y) = Ix(x, y) + Ix(y, x) - 1 
IXB(X, y)  = IX(X, y )  -- IXI(X, y )  
IXw(X, y)  = IX(y, x )  - IXt(x, y )  (2.2) 
can be understood, respectively, as the degree to which the two alterna- 
tives are indifferent (xly), the degree of strict preference of x over y, (xBy, 
x is better than y)  and the degree of strict preference of y over x (xWy, x is 
worse than y). A cycle of preferences will be defined over chains G = (x 1 
-- X 2 . . . .  X k -- Xl) of k distinct alternatives as 
XlP lX2P  2 ... xkPkx l  
where Ph E {W, I ,B}  for all h = 1,2 . . . . .  k. A cycle x1P1x2P  2 "'" XkPkX 1 
is irrational if either 
• Ph E { B, I} for all h = 1,2 . . . . .  kand  BE{Ph:h= 1,2 . . . . .  k};or 
• Ph E {W, I}  for all h = 1,2 . . . . .  k and WE {Ph: h = 1,2 . . . . .  k}. 
We say that a cycle is rational if it is not irrational. Then, given any fuzzy 
preference IX over a fixed set of alternatives and a chain of alternatives, we 
can look for all possible rational cycles of preferences, weigh them in a 
natural way and assign to the chain a degree of rationality (see [6, 9]). 
Specifically, this is done as follows. Given a cycle C-  x lP  2 ... XkPkX 1 
where Ph c {B, I, W} for all h = 1, 2 , . . . ,  k, the natural weight associated 
to C and denoted by A(C) will be 
a(C)  = II~,= 1 Ixeh(Xh, Xh + 1) 
where Xk+ 1 : Xl for convenience. 
Therefore, given a chain G = (x 1 - x z . . . . .  x k - x~) a natural degree 
of rationality associated to G and denoted by A~,(G) can be defined as 
A. (G)  = ~ A(C). 
C ~ rat .cycles 
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As proven in [6, 9], A~,(G) verifies 
1 - A~(G) = Ilhk=l IZ(Xh, Xh+ l) 
-t- Hk=ll,  Z(Xh+l,Xh ) -- 2I~k=lld, l(Xh,Xh+l ). (2 .3)  
In view of (2.3), once a finite set of alternatives X has been fixed, 
rationality can be defined as a fuzzy property A: 9 (X)  ~ [0, 1] with 
A(/x) = minAs(G) (2.4) 
G 
and where .~(X)  is the set of all complete fuzzy preferences. 
Once a group of n > 2 individuals is fixed, we should be able to 
aggregate their opinions about any set of alternatives in a coherent way. 
Therefore, in [6] were defined aggregation operations that can take into 
account any extra alternative x so to properly extend any previous aggre- 
gated opinion relative to a collection of alternatives not containing x. The 
key properties are the standard conditions 
• (IIA) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: each aggregated pref- 
erence relation /z(x, y) depends olely on the values lzi(x, y), i.e. on 
the individual preference intensities of x over y. 
• (UD) Unrestricted Domain: the aggregation rule is defined over all 
possible profiles of fuzzy preferences. Intensity aggregation rules are 
defined as follows. 
DEFINITION 2.1 An intensity aggregation rule is any mapping ~b: [0, 1] n 
[0, 1] which assigns a fuzzy preference intensity to each profile of individual 
fuzzy preference intensities. [] 
If we only assume (IIA) and (UD), an intensity aggregation rule ¢: [0, 1] n 
[0, 1] may depend on the pair of alternatives x, y. Specifically, we may 
have 
~( ~,,~I(x, y ) , ' " ,  [zn(x, y)) 4= qb(/xl(w, z),-",/zn(W, z)) 
even though txi(x, y) = ixi(w, z) for all i = 1, 2 . . . .  , n. 
We assume then the following condition 
• (N) Neutrality: given any permutation of the set of alternatives 7r, if 
vi(x, y) = tzi(Tr(x), 7r(y)) for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n and any pair of alter- 
natives x, y, then 
~b(ul(x, y) , - " ,  u ' (x ,  y))  = th(/zl(Tr(x), ~r(y)), . . . , /xn(Ir(x),  ~(y) ) )  
Hierarchies of Intensity Preference Aggregations 127 
As a consequence, it is clear that the same intensity aggregation map- 
ping ~b will be associated to any pair of alternatives and therefore each 
possible aggregation procedure is characterized by one of these intensity 
aggregation mappings. 
For  the t ime being, we will suppose that conditions I IA, UD,  N hold. 
Given ~b and n individuals expressing their opinion on the set of 
alternatives X, the aggregated preference /x defined on X × X associated 
to ~b is defined as 
/z(x, y)  = ~b(/xl(x, y ) , . . . , / z " (x ,  y) )  Vx, y c X. 
Standard ethical conditions may also be imposed on the intensity aggre- 
gation rules, among them: 
• (NNR) Non-negative Responsiveness: 
q~(a 1, a 2 . . . . .  a . )  > th(b 1, b 2 . . . . .  b . )  
if a i > b i for all i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n. 
• (PR) Positive Responsiveness: 
qb(al, a 2 . . . . .  a n) > th(bm, b 2 . . . . .  b . )  
if a i > b i for all i = 1,2 . . . . .  n and there exist 1 < j  < n such that 
a) > bj. 
• (A) Anonymity:  given any permutat ion ~-: {1 . . . . .  n} ~ {1 . . . .  , n}, we 
have 
~b(al, a2 , . - . ,  an) = ¢b(a=o) . . . . .  a~r(n)). 
• (U) Unanimity: if a i = a for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, then 
th(a 1, a 2 . . . . .  a n) = a. 
• (CS) Citizen Sovereign: for any given a ~ [0, 1] there exists a profile 
(a 1, a 2 . . . . .  a n) ~ [0, 1] n such that 
dP(a l ,a2 , . . . ,a  n) = a. 
• (ND) Non-dictatorship: there is no individual i such that 
c~(a l ,a2 , . . . ,an)  = a i 
for any (a m . . . . .  a i_ l ,a i+ 1 . . . . .  a n) ~ [0,1] n - l .  
Definitions of completeness and rationality can be naturally extended to 
intensity aggregation rules. 
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In particular, an intensity aggregation rule is said to be complete if the 
associated aggregated fuzzy preference is complete for any profile of 
complete individual preferences. 
The fuzzy property of rationality is extended to intensity aggregation 
rules in the following way. 
DEFINITION 2.2 Given n individuals, an intensity aggregation rule 
~b: [0, 1] n ~ [0, 1] is non-absolutely irrational ( NAI),  or simply non-irra- 
tional, if for any arbitrary finite set of alternatives X,  the associated 
aggregated preference iz: X × X ~ [0, 1] is complete and non-absolutely 
irrational, i.e., A( tz )  > O, whenever all individuals are complete and non- 
absolutely irrational themselves, i.e., A(  tz i) > 0 for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, with 
]~i: X X X ~ [0, 1] for all i. 
It is clear that in this way both individual and social opinions are 
required to belong to the set of Non-absolutely Irrational (NAI) complete 
fuzzy preference relations. Therefore, we are in fact modifying the unre- 
stricted domain condition. 
One characterization f complete intensity aggregations rules is given by 
the following lemma proven in [6]. 
LEMMA 2.1 Given an intensity aggregation rule ~b: [0, 1] n --* [0, 1], 4) is 
complete if and only if 
q~(a 1. . . . .  a n) + ~b(b 1 . . . . .  b n) > 1 
whenever a i h- b i >_ 1 for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n. • 
The main result proven in [6] is the following. 
THEOREM 2.1 Let th: [0, 1] n ~ [0, 1] be a complete intensity aggregation 
rule verifying condition A and such that th(1 . . . . .  1) = 1 and ~b(O . . . . .  O) = 
O. Then ch is NAI  if and only if the following conditions hold: 
(i) if a i + b i>  1 
fora l l i  = 1,2 . . . . .  nthen qb(a 1 . . . . .  a,,) + ~b(b 1 . . . . .  b n) > 1; 
(ii) th(a 1 . . . .  ,a  n) = 1 impliesa i = 1 fora l l i  = 1,2 . . . . .  n. • 
More specifically, from the proof of theorem 2.1. it can be concluded that 
in order for a complete intensity aggregation rule to be NAI, conditions (i) 
and (ii) are sufficient. 
In the next section we will introduce our main definition and prove our 
main results. 
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3. HIERARCHICAL AGGREGATION RULES 
Let us first introduce some useful notation. 
By [i 1, i 1 . . . . .  i n ] we will denote the ordered list whose first element is i 1, 
second element is i2, and so on. I will denote the empty list and given a list 
L, ILl will denote the length of  the list. Moreover, let • be the classical ist 
concatenation or composition operator. So, given two lists L 1, L 2 with 
n = ILll and m = ILzl, L = L 1 . L  2 is the list of length n + m whose first 
n elements are the elements of L 1 and whose last m elements are the 
elements of L 2. Moreover, given a list L the notation j ~ L has the 
obvious intended meaning. Finally, given a list L we define the operator -k 
that produces the set of elements of the list L, i.e. ~L  = {j: j ~ L}. 
Given a list L and m lists L 1 . . . . .  L m we say that the list _~= 
[L  1 . . . . .  Lm] is a cover of  L if the following conditions are verified: 
• L k~Dfora l l  k= 1,2 . . . . .  m; 
• for all k = 1, 2 . . . . .  m, no two elements of L k are equal; 
• "&L = IJ i=m l~Li" 
Given a list of indices I = [ i  1 . . . . .  in] and an intensity aggregation rule 4,, 
we introduce the following notation 
4,(ahlh E I )  = 4,(ai, . . . . .  aim). 
The following is our main definition. 
DEFINITION 3.1 Let I be a finite list of  individuals and let [11 . . . . .  Ico] be 
a fixed cover of  I. Let m = III and m k = Ilkl for all k = 1,2 . . . . .  c 0. A 
hierarchical aggregation is characterized by a collection 4,0, 4,1, 4,2 . . . . .  4,¢o 
of  intensity aggregation rules with c o > 2 and with m k > 1 for some 
1 < k < c o , such that 4,k:[0,1] mk --* [0, 1] for all k = O, 1,2 . . . . .  c o , in 
such a way that the composition 
4, - 4,0(4,1, 4,2 . . . . .  4,c0): [0 ,1 ] "  - ,  [0,1] 
defined as follows 
4,(ak[k E I )  = 4,0(4,1(ah1 h E 11) . . . . .  4,~o(ahlh ~ I~o) )
is an intensity aggregation rule. [] 
To clarify definition 3.1. consider the following example. Let I = [1, 2, 3, 4] 
and for c o = 3 consider the cover [I1, 12, 13] with 11 = [1, 2], 12 = [2, 3, 1], 
13 = [4, 1, 3]. So given any input (al, a2, a3, an) we have 
4,(al, a2, a3, a4) = 4,0(4,1(al, a2), 4,2(a2, a3, al) ,  4,3(a4, al, a3)). 
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Assuming an a priori fixed cover [11 . . . . .  Ico] of I, each hierarchical 
aggregation is therefore characterized by the composition ~b0(~bl, 4~2 . . . . .  
$c0)- Our main goal is checking if ethical and rational conditions imposed 
on the basic aggregation maps ~b 0, 4~1, ~b2 . . . . .  ~bc0, propagate under these 
compositions, that is, if hierarchical aggregations lead to ethical and 
rational intensity aggregation rules whenever each basic aggregation rule is 
ethical and rational. 
If a property P that holds for th0, ~bl, th2 . . . . .  ~bc0 holds for ~b0(th 1 . . . . .  
$c0) as well (for any fixed cover) we will say that P propagates under 
hierarchical aggregation. 
As a simple consequence of functional composition many properties 
propagate under hierarchical aggregation, among them completeness, 
non-negative r sponsiveness (NNR), positive responsiveness (PR), unanim- 
ity (U), and conditions (i) and (ii) of theorem 2.1. 
Our first result is the following. 
THEOREM 3.1 I f  t~O , t~l , t~2 . . . . .  t~n ° are NAI  intensity aggregation rules 
then 4) -~ Cbo(~bl, ¢b2,..., ch~,) is also NAI,  i.e., rationality propagates under 
hierarchical aggregation. 
Proof Let X be a set of alternatives and let /z 1 . . . . .  ~n be n NAI 
individuals. Let us denote by v the aggregation function associated to 4~ 
and by u k the aggregation function associated to ~b~ for all k = 
0, 1, 2 , . . . ,  n 0. Since all the individuals/~l . . . .  , ~ are NAI so are uj . . . . .  ~'n0" 
On the other hand, since ~b 0 is NAI and in view of definition 2.2, we have 
that its aggregation function u 0 defined as 
 0(x, y) = y) . . . . .  y)) 
is NAI. Therefore, since 
~(x,  y)  = Uo(x, y)  
we have that th is NAI. • 
It is easy to observe that anonymity (A) and citizen sovereign (CS) do 
not in general propagate. Clearly, anonymity propagates in the extreme 
case in which the cover [11 . . . . .  /co] verifies the condition I~ = Ih for all 
h,k  = 1 . . . . .  c o. 
Anonymity propagates also in the special case of balanced aggregations, 
defined as follows. 
A hierarchical aggregation th -= ~b0(~bl . . . . .  4~c0) with list of indices I and 
cover [11 . . . .  , lco] is balanced when: 
• (bl) ~b h = ~bj for all h , j  = 1,2 . . . . .  Co; 
• (b2) for every permutation ~r of I there exists a permutation 6 of the 
set of indices {1 . . . . .  c 0} such that for all h = 1, 2 . . . . .  c 0, 
"kI6(h) ---- {~r(i)]i ~ Ih}. 
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For instance, consider the hierarchical aggregation (~0((~1, ~1, t~l) with 
~bl:[0,1] 2 ~ [0,1] and with the associated list 1 = [1,2,3] and cover 
[11, 12, 13] with 11 = [2, 1], 12 = [1, 3], 13 = [3, 2]. Given any permutation 
7r: {1, 2, 3} ~ {1, 2, 3} it is clear that condition (b2) holds. 
The following simple theorem proves our claim. 
THEOREM 3.2 Anonymity propagates under balanced hierarchical aggre- 
gations. 
Proof  Let t~: [0, 1] n---~ [0, 1] be a balanced hierarchical amalgation. 
Specifically, let ~b - ~b0(~b I . . . . .  ~bl) with oh0: [0, 1] c° ~ [0, 1]. Let [11 . . . . .  /~,,] 
be the cover for I = [1, 2 , . . . ,  n]. 
Let us suppose that S0 and thl verify anonymity and let 7r be a 
permutation of the set of indices {1,2 . . . . .  n}. We want to prove that 
~b(a  . . . .  , an) = ~b(a~(1) . . . . .  a=(n)). 
From the definition of hierarchical aggregation we have 
(~(a,n-(l , . . . . .  a~(m) = th0(Chl(a~,h)lh ~ 11) . . . . .  qbl(a~(h)lh ~ lco) ), 
In view of condition (b2) there exists a permutation ~ of the set of indices 
{1, 2 . . . . .  c 0} such that for all h = 1, 2 . . . .  , Co we have ~l,~h) = {Tr(j)lj 
lh}. Therefore,  since ~b I verifies anonymity we have that for all h = 
1,.. . ,  c o, 
4~l(aylj ~ lh) = chl(ajlj ~ 16(h) ) = ~bl(a=~j)l  ~ lh). 
Thus, 
So( ,(a  h,lh I,) . . . . .   l(a  h)lh 
= So( ,(ailJ  l(ailj 
Finally, since So verifies anonymity we can conclude that the theorem is 
proven. • 
Concerning Citizen Sovereign, we observe that any nondecreasing inten- 
sity aggregation rule 4, satisfying CS must be a continuous mapping such 
that ~b(1,..., 1) = 1 and ~b(0 . . . . .  0) = 0. Therefore, if ~b 0, ~bl,... ,  ~bn0 are 
nondecreasing and satisfy CS, ~b is nondecreasing, continuous, and satisfies 
CS. Continuity is a very important property from a practical point of view. 
Indeed, jumps in the aggregation rule would imply that small changes in 
the input may produce big changes in the output, leading to aggregation 
rules that are not stable, according to the following definition. 
DEFINITION 3.2 An intensity aggregation rule ch is stable if there exists a 
constant K (called stability constant) such that for all E > 0 and for all 
i=  1 , . . . ,m,  
I ck (a l , . . . ,a i _ l ,a  i + E,ai+ 1 . . . . .  a m) - ~b(a 1. . . . .  am)l < Ke 
for all a I . . . .  , a m . [] 
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The following theorem shows that stability propagates under hierarchi- 
cal aggregation. 
THEOREM 3.3 Let  ~0,  t~l . . . . .  t~c ° be stable intensity aggregation rules. 
Then dp = qbo( dpl . . . . .  qbCo) is stable. 
Proof Let for k = 0 , . . . ,  Co, K k be the stability constant of ~b k. Follow- 
ing definition 3.1 let I be the set of individuals and [11 . . . . .  /Co] a cover of 
I with I k associated to ~b~ for all k = 1, . . . ,  c 0. Let us show that 
Ith(a 1 . . . . .  a i_ l ,a  i + E, ai+ 1 . . . . .  a m) -- q~(a 1. . . . .  am)l < Ke  
for a certain constant K. 
le t  us first suppose for simplicity that there exists a unique j such that 
i ~ Ij. Therefore, if we put O/k = Chk(ahlh ~ Ik) for k = 1, 2 . . . .  , Co, we 
have 
t~(a l , . . . , a i _ l ,a  i -t- E,a i+ 1 . . . . .  ac) = t~0(a l ' ' ' ' '  O / j - l '  O/}' O/ j+I '  O/c0 ) '  
where from the hypothesys of stability ~bj, IO/~ - O/j[ < Kj e. Therefore, since 
4'0 is stable we can conclude that 
[~b(al . . . . .  a i l ai q- E, a i+  1 . . . . .  am) - qb(al . . . .  ,am)[ < KoK jE .  
If on the other hand there exist Jl . . . . .  Jt such that i belongs to all the 
lists Ij~ . . . . .  Ih, reasoning as above we obtain 
I~b(al . . . . .  a i_ l ,a  i q- e ,a i+ 1 . . . . .  a m) -- t~(a  1 . . . . .  am) l  
< Ko(K  h + K h + "" +K j )e ,  
which proves the theorem. • 
FINAL COMMENTS 
In this paper we have introduced hierarchical aggregation on intensity 
preference. The practical importance of such aggregation rules is quite 
dear, since many complex group decision-making procedures are defined 
as hierarchical aggregations. Therefore, the fact that standard ethical 
conditions as well as rationality propagate under general conditions is a 
very significative result. Anonymity, in general, does not propagate, how- 
ever we must notice that such an ethical condition is related to very 
specific problems and commonly assumed. Indeed, in many decision-mak- 
ing processes, individuals are not considered all equal but they are weighted 
according to various factors like for instance, the individual experience and 
knowledge of the specific subject. As a final remark about the usefulness of 
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hierarchical aggregations, we recall the propagation of stability. Such a 
result, apart from its theoretical interest, legitimizes hierarchical aggrega- 
tions from an applicative point of view, since it guarantees the stability of 
the whole process once it has been put into practice. 
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